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CLARENCE THOMAS:
THE FIRST TEN YEARS
LOOKING FOR CONSISTENCY
MARK C. NILES*
Ten years ago, when George Herbert Walker Bush nominated
Clarence Thomas to replace Thurgood Marshall as an Associate
Justice of the United States Supreme Court,1 I, like many Americans
and most lawyers, waited with interest to hear information about this
soon-to-be-powerful man. I had a vague recollection from my recent
law school days of hearing about a young, conservative, black federal
judge who might be inline for a nomination to the Court. This vague
reference was all that I had heard of Clarence Thomas prior to the
Fall of 1991.
When stories about Thomas began to appear in the press,2 the
information supported my tenuous perceptions: Thomas was a
young, extremely well educated African-American from a modest
background.3  Thomas had worked in the Reagan and Bush
administrations and had publicly denounced affirmative action and
other policies generally supported by what was still known as the
'Civil Rights Community.'4 While I was in no way pleased by what
. Associate Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law. J.D.,
Stanford University, 1991; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1988.
1. See Margaret Carlson, Marching to a Different Drummer, TIME, July 15, 1991, at
18 (discussing President Bush's selection of Clarence Thomas to succeed Thurgood
Marshall on the Supreme Court).
2. See, e.g., id. (explaining Thomas' position on affirmative action and the civil
rights movement); David A. Kaplan, Supreme Mystery, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1991, at 18
(providing a lengthy profile of Thomas' career, personal history, and political views
and highlighting the contradiction that "Thomas is an intense opponent of
affirmative action, yet has benefited from it throughout his life").
3. See Carlson, supra note 1, at 18 (noting that Thomas grew up in a home
without indoor plumbing in "dirt-poor rural Georgia").
4. See Jack W. Germond & Jules Witcover, Behind Clarence Thomas' Strange
Complaint is One Very Angry Man, BALT. SUN, Aug. 3, 1998, at 11A (noting that Thomas
has suggested that affirmative action implies an inferiority to which he does not
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these stories indicated about Thomas' political and social views,5 I was
not particularly surprised or upset. After all, we had a Republican
president. One of the reasons why I had so fervently hoped that we
would not have a Republican president was that I knew he would
have the authority to appoint people to the Court that agreed with
him and not me. With the rare, wonderful and blindly lucky
exception of William Brennan6 or David Souter,7 presidents usually
do a pretty good job of choosing people with ideologies similar to
their own. Thus, I was not surprised that one of President Bush's
judicial nominees would share his ideology.
However, I did have a certain amount of discomfort with the fact
that this new Justice would be the only African-American on the
Court. This discomfort stemmed out of the fact that his views on
issues, particularly those with direct impact on and special interest to
the African-American community, were quite divergent from the
beliefs of my family,-friends and most African-Americans that I knew.
Yet even my concern that the only African-American on the Court
would not be ideologically representative of the broader African-
American community did not cause me significant concern.
Although my political views are much closer to what I perceive to be
the "mainstream" among African-Americans than Justice Thomas', I
do not subscribe to the belief that it is necessary or even preferable,
that all or most black people share similar political beliefs. While I
acknowledge that the culture, history and experiences that most
African-Americans share across relevant social boundaries such as
subscribe); Doubts About Thomas: William Gibson of the NAACP Announces Decision to
Oppose Clarence Thomas's Nomination for the Supreme Court, TIME, Aug. 12, 1991, at 32
(discussing how the nation's oldest civil rights organization, while praising Thomas'
success in overcoming poverty in rural Georgia, criticized Thomas' "insensitivity to
giving those who may not have any bootstraps the opportunity to pull themselves
up ).
5. I am an ardent supporter of racially-conscious admissions and employment
policies, as well as many other kinds of policies that Thomas apparently opposed.
6. See Richard Lacayo, One Step Down. Who Steps Up?, TIME, Apr. 18, 1994, at 35
(discussing the "famous mistake of [Republican President] Dwight Eisenhower
[who] decided it would help him win the 1956 election if he gave the Court seat to
an Irish Catholic: William Brennan, who turned out to be one the century's most
effective Court liberals"); Martin Tolchin, Vacancy on the Court; A Man in Close Touch
with People as well as with History, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 1990, at A22 (recounting Justice
Brennan's appointment to the Supreme Court by President Eisenhower in 1956).
7. See Neil A. Lewis, Sworn in as 105th Justice, Souter Says Shock Recedes, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1990, at A22 (noting that conservatives have long derided Justice Souter as a
judicial activist); Vivea Novak, Off the Bench? Think the Ashcroft Battle was Ugly? The War
Over Our Next Supreme Court Justice Could Start Soon, TIME, Feb. 26, 2001, at 54
(discussing how the right wing is opposed to "more Souters," a phrase used to




class, age and geography, make it likely that there will be relative
unanimity on some key issues, I think diversity of opinion in the
African-American community would be a significant advantage to our
political power and the social and economic standing of African-
Americans. If more black people demonstrated a conservative
viewpoint on some subjects, or at least indicated a relative openness
to some ideas from the right of the political spectrum, perhaps
African-Americans would be taken as seriously and paid as much
attention as other potential swing voter groups, such as "suburban
Moms " 8 or "Reagan Democrats."9  These swing votes, at least
according to the media, dominate the focus of our current national
politics.' If more of African-Americans were considered to be
potential political free agents, both major parties would be obliged to
curry our favor as opposed to ignore us as both parties primarily do
now. One party ignores us out of security and the other out of
resignation." Thus, even the fact that the only African-American on
the Court would be a conservative and not representative of the
ideology of most black people, although certainly a disappointment,
was something that I thought might, in an odd way, invigorate the
political dynamics of Black America in an interesting, if not
completely positive, way.
But as the days, weeks and years passed, notwithstanding my early
stoicism, serious concerns about the candidate, and later the Justice,
began to arise. These concerns were not based on Justice Thomas'
beliefs or ideology, but on a growing set of inconsistencies that began
to arise between some of his beliefs and actions. With all due respect
to a man who was highly accomplished even before he became a
Supreme Court Justice and who has received constant and seemingly
heartfelt support from many of his colleagues, I still have serious
concerns about these inconsistencies. It is these issues that have
dominated my perception of the first ten years of Justice Thomas'
8. See Parties Woo "Soccer Mom" with Lots of Family Talk, USA TODAY, Aug. 29, 1996,
at 14A [hereinafter "Soccer Moml (identifying the population of stressed-out
suburban moms as a target of political strategists due to their position as swing
voters).
9. See Laurence I. Barrett, Reagan Democrats' Divided Loyalties (Some Will Vote for
Michael Dukakis, Some Will Vote for George Bush), TIME, Oct. 31, 1988, at 14 (describing
Reagan Democrats as a critical voting group representing twelve percent of the
electorate).
10. See "Soccer Mom," supra note 8, at 14A (noting that suburban moms are a
critical component of the national class of swing votes).
11. One could even point to the lack of focus of the major third party insurgence
of Ralph Nader and the Green party on the issues of the urban poor to support the
conclusion that the relative political hegemony of the black community discourages
attention even from the far left.
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tenure on the Court and that I will address briefly.
The first of these concerns is not focused exclusively on Justice
Thomas but on the block of the Court with which he has identified
himself from the beginning of his tenure. This block of invariably
three Justices (Rehnquist, Scalia and Thomas) 12 and more often than
not five Justices (including O'Connor and Kennedy)1 3 have been
consistently characterized by themselves and others as "judicial
conservatives." 4 Justice Thomas has been similarly characterized by
himself and others as a "judicial conservative."' 5
Ten years ago, when Justice Thomas was nominated to the Court, I
had just graduated from law school and I was very familiar with the
late 20th century, post-Warren Court judicial conservative ideology.
As expressed by former D.C. Circuit Court Judge Robert Bork, Justice
Antonin Scalia and others, judicial conservative theorists argued that
the Warren Court and other liberal activist courts had stepped
outside the proper bounds of their duty as jurists. These liberal
activist courts had ignored the strict construction and original intent
of the Constitution in order to impose legal opinions upon the
nation that were not in line with the will of the people as expressed
12. See Scorr DOUGLAS GERBER, FIRST PRINCIPLES: THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CLARENCE THOMAS 209-10 (1999) (providing statistical data that Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas voted together seventy-seven percent of the time during the
1991-95 terms).
13. See The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: The Statistics, 114 HARV. L. REv. 390, 395
(2000) (noting that during the Court's 1999-2000 term, the majority in eleven of the
eighteen 5-4 decisions comprised Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and
Thomas and that no other block of Justices voted together to create a 5-4 decision
more than once); see also The Supreme Court, 1998 Term: The Statistics, 113 HARv. L.
REv. 400, 405 (1999) (indicating that during the 1998-99 term, seven out of sixteen 5-
4 decisions included Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas);
The Supreme Court 1997 Term: Leading Cases, 112 HARV. L. REv. 355, 371 (1998)
(noting that in the 1997-98 term, six out of fifteen 5-4 decisions included Justices
Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas).
14. See Frank I. Michelman, Bush v. Gore: Suspicion or the New Prince, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 679, 679-80 (2001) (characterizing Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas,
O'Connor and Kennedy as judicial conservatives who acted suspiciously out-of-
character in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Crowded Center, 80 A.B.A. J. 78, 79 (1994) (characterizing Justices Rehnquist, Scalia
and Thomas as the Court's conservatives, who are often joined by Justices O'Connor
and Kennedy).
15. See Terry Eastland, Judicial Selection: All Presidential Candidates Should Face
Questions on this Important Issue, DALLAS MORN. NEWS, Feb. 20, 2000, at 5J
(characterizing Justice Thomas as a judicial conservative consciously appointed by
Republican president).
16. See generally Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation, Character, and
Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992) (criticizing the liberal constitutional
interpretations of the Warren Court).
17. See generally Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66 IND.




by elected legislatures and were not justified by the language of the
Constitution. ' The argument continued that even if some of these
judicially-imposed decisions were "laudable" 9  or "socially
desirable,"2o they were still erroneous and dangerous actions by a
non-elected judicial entity with no real basis for their decisions in the
law. It was on this basis that Bork and others of his ilk argued that
the case of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka,2' although
22"laudable," had been a severe judicial overreach and error.
As a recent law school graduate, still somewhat immersed in the
theoretical intricacies as opposed to the practical realities of
constitutional theory, I actually found myself somewhat, if not
completely, sympathetic to the foundational principles of this judicial
conservative theory. Although I thought the application of this
theory to argue that cases addressing racially discriminatory laws and
practices were wrongly decided, was unjustifiable and strongly
suggestive of serious racial bias, I was sympathetic to the idea that the
proper role of judges should be to interpret and not make the law. I
1
18. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the majority unjustifiably overrode the Colorado state legislature and
imposed the will of the liberal law school elite on the people of Colorado by striking
down a law denying homosexuals state protection); ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING
TOwARDs GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE 96 (1996) (arguing
that by relaxing their commitment to bedrock legal principles, judges have"slouched" toward a world of moral relativism and diminished society); ROBERT H.
BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 143 (1990)
[hereinafter THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA] (explaining Bork's originalist perspective on
the Constitution); Richard Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional
Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REv. 226, 283 (1988)
(espousing an originalist theory and claiming that the framers intended judges to
not have "any role as formulators of some values apart from positive law").
19. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 18, at 75 (arguing that although Brown
v. Board of Education of Topeka was a "great and correct decision," it was a weak and
unsupported interpretation of the law).
20. THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 18, at 76 (explaining how the Warren
Court attempted to do what was socially acceptable or wise).
21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that the segregation of public schools was
unconstitutional).
22. See Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353, 364-66,
373, 376 (1981) (criticizing Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka as being wrongly
decided). While Judge Bork has actually publicly defended the results in Brown, he
has criticized the Court's decision in Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), which struck
down racially restrictive covenants under the Fourth Amendment. Bork has also
attacked the principle of "one man, one vote," calling it "counter to the text of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 1-15, 18 (1971) [hereinafter Neutral Principles].
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was a law clerk to Justice Jackson while the Court was
considering Brown, notoriously urged Jackson to uphold racially segregated schools
in a memo later found in Judge Jackson's file on the case. See David J. Garrow, The
Rehnquist Reins, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1996, at 65 (noting that Justice Rehnquist later
claimed the memo represented Justice Jackson's views and not his own).
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had been convinced of at least this much by my law school professor
John Hart Ely. Ely had argued eloquently, both in print and in class,
that the very basis of our democratic system is threatened when
judges are not constrained by an objective limiting principle to form
the basis for their decisions, particularly decisions that overturn
democratically enacted law. 23 Although I did not agree with most of
the applications of this concept to past and current legal disputes, I
saw it as a reasonable and seemingly ascendant judicial philosophy.
The way that this supposed orthodoxy of judicial conservatism has
further developed over the past ten years has left me severely
disillusioned and suspicious of the true motivations of its proponents.
What was characterized as a doctrine of judicial restraint has
24morphed into a new, aggressive, and repressive judicial activism.
The current Supreme Court has spent much of the last ten years
restructuring the balance of power between the federal and the state
governments.- They have done so with open disregard to what had
supposedly been the immovable pillars of judicial conservatism: the
plain language of the Constitution; the original intent of the framers;
and controlling legal precedent . In the two key areas of the
Commerce Clause2 and the Eleventh Amendment," this Court, with
23. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7-
8 (1980).
Our constitutional development over the past century has therefore
substantially strengthened the original commitment to control by a majority
of the governed. Neither has there existed among theorists or among
Americans generally any serious challenge to the general notion of
majoritarian control. Rule by an aristocracy, even in modem dress, is not
what Americans have ever wanted.., whatever the explanation, and
granting the qualifications, rule in accord with the consent of a majority of
those governed is the core of the American governmental system .... [A] n
untrammeled majority is indeed a dangerous thing, but it will require a
heroic inference to get from that realization to the conclusion that the
enforcement be unelected officials of an 'unwritten constitution' is an
appropriate response in a democratic republic.
Id.
24. See Alexandria Jones, The Rehnquist Court's Activism and the Risk of Injustice, 26
CONN. L. REv. 53, 63 (1993) (discussing how the Rehnquist Court utilized judicial
activism to limit and reform the habeas corpus procedures available to inmates after
the Court was unsuccessful in urging Congress to alter the habeas corpus statutes).
25. See John J. Dinan, The Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions in Perspective, 15 J.L.
& POL. 127, 193 (1999) (explaining that " [w] hat is distinctive about the Rehnquist
Court is that a majority has, for the first time, confronted federalism directly and
made the case that the defense of federalism ought to be an explicit responsibility of
the Supreme Court").
26. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 22 NOVA L.
REV. 741, 758 (1998) (discussing the tenants ofjudicial conservatism).
27. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000) (holding that the
portion of the Violence Against Women Act which granted a federal civil remedy to
victims of gender-motivated violence occurring within one state's boundaries was
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the faithful vote of Justice Thomas, has expressly and repeatedly
interpreted constitutional provisions contrary to their language2 and
willingly (even enthusiastically) rolled back precedent in support of
their view that the federal government has too much power in our
society and that more of it should be given to the States. 0  Just
recently, Justice Thomas and his four conservative colleagues,
decided that the Eleventh Amendment prohibts private citizens from
suing a State who discriminated against them.3' The Court arrived at
this holding even though, as the Court has expressly acknowledged
repeatedly during the course of its decade long state sovereign
immunity campaign, the Eleventh Amendment by it terms does
32nothing to preclude the kind of law suit at issue in the case.
outside Congress' Commerce Clause power); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,
553-68 (1995) (holding that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause power when it
enacted the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a federal crime to
possess a firearm in a school zone).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (" The judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any
foreign State.").
29. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 357-58 (2001) (explaining
that although "by its terms" the Eleventh Amendment restricts only suits against a
state by citizens of another state, the Court has expanded the amendment's
applicability to also restrict suits by citizens against their own states); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 72-73 (2000) (discussing the limitations the Eleventh
Amendment places on citizen suits against states); Coll. Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 627, 659-60 (1999) (discussing the Court's
various interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment including the doctrine of
sovereign immunity); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)
(restating the sovereign immunity doctrine); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15(1l89o).
Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh Amendment, had
appended to it a proviso that nothing therein contained should prevent a
state from being sued by its own citizens in cases arising under the
constitution or laws of the United States, can we imagine that it would have
been adopted by the states? The supposition that it would is almost an
absurdity on its face.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614-15 (rejecting the reasoning in Heart of
Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), and other related cases, which
reasoned that burdens on interstate travel can substantially effect interstate
commerce.); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556-60 (confining precedent such as Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) and Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), which
accepted aggregate effects on interstate commerce as sufficiently substantial to justify
federal legislation under the Commerce Clause, to their particular facts).
31. See Alexander v. Sandoval, 531 U.S. 1049, 1523 (2001) (holding that a State
whose driving license policies disparately impacted non-English speakers could not
be sued by private citizens due to the Eleventh Amendment).
32. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 363 (stating that " [allthough by its terms the
Amendment applies only to suits against a state by citizens of another state, our cases
have extended the Amendment's applicability to suits by citizens against their own
states").
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These decisions regarding the Eleventh Amendment and the
Commerce Clause have defined the Court over the past ten years and
have been subjected to broad and diverse criticism.33 In my opinion,
the most disturbing aspect of these cases is their clear demonstration
of the emptiness of the supposed conservative judicial ideology and
the invidious basis for the criticism by the political right of the
groundbreaking Supreme Court decisions of the middle of the past
century. If this Court and these five conservative Justices are willing
to ignore the language of the Constitution, original intent, and
precedent while serving their political or ideological agenda, then
what was the real basis of their passionate criticism of Warren Court
decisions34 such as Brown v. Board of Education,3 Miranda v. Arizona,3
and Gideon v. Wainwright?37 Was it really that the Justices were
stepping beyond their proper role within our system when they
decided that schools should not be segregated based on race,3 that in
order for our constitutional protections to have real significance
31citizens must be made aware of their rights, or that due process
requires that criminal defendants be provided with legal counsel that
33. See, e.g., Kenneth W. Hartman, Lochner's Cousin: Demonstrating Originalism's
Failure and Its Disingenuous Nature, 34 CREIGHTON L. REV. 517, 545-46 (2001)
(criticizing the doctrine of state sovereign immunity as a nonoriginalist element of
the Rehnquist Court's "new federalism"); Molly E. Homan, United States v. Lopez:
The Supreme Court Guns Down the Commerce Clause, 73 DENy. U. L. REV. 237, 240 (1995)
(criticizing the Supreme Court in United States v. Lopez for "effectively resuscitat[ing]
an era of judicial policymaking and arbitrary decisions"); John Randolph Prince,
Caught in a Trap: The Romantic Reading of the Eleventh Amendment, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 411,
504-07 (2000) (criticizing the Court for abandoning the text of the Eleventh
Amendment in pursuit of a vague and unjust concept of state sovereign immunity).
34. See, e.g., THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA, supra note 18, at 99 (criticizing the
Warren Court for creating a right of privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965), which struck down a state anti-contraceptive); Neutral Principles, supra note
22, at 7-18 (attacking various Warren Court decisions such as Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948), which struck down racially restrictive covenants under the Fourteenth
Amendment); Monaghan, supra note 22, at 364-66 (providing a conservative criticism
of Brown and other Warren Court decisions).
35. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (holding that segregation of school children on the
basis of race deprives non-white children of equal educational opportunities).
36. 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966) (holding that the Fifth Amendment right against
self-incrimination requires the police notify an individual of their constitutional
rights upon being taken into custody).
37. 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963) (holding that indigent criminal defendants have
a constitutional due process right to counsel).
38. See Brown, 349 U.S. at 298 (declaring that "racial discrimination in public
education is unconstitutional").
39. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (holding that before a person in custody is
interrogated by the police "the person must be warned that he has a right to remain
silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed").
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gave rise to the critiques?0 Or was it more what they were doing,
rather than how they did it, that led to the dispute? The willingness of
the current Court's majority to employ the same devices that they and
their intellectual brethren have so roundly criticized when used by
others, in the service of their own ideological goals strongly suggests
that it was the substance of the challenged decisions that was the real
point of contention.
While I cannot read minds and I am genuinely loath to assume
malevolent motives, there are serious inconsistencies embodied in
the current mission of the Supreme Court. It is Justice Thomas'
enthusiastic participation in this mission that has caused me the most
serious concern and that will have the broadest impact.
The other two major concerns that I have about the first ten years
of Justice Thomas' tenure relate directly to inconsistencies created by
some of his statements and actions. The first of these concerns arose
during his confirmation hearings with his response to Anita Hill's
allegations of sexual harassment. Notwithstanding the difficult
position in which he found himself (or placed himself, depending on
which of the various stories one believes) ,4 I was stunned by Justice
Thomas' public and passionate contention that he believed that the
attacks upon him were racially motivated.42 Indeed, he referred to
the attacks and the process surrounding them as a "high-tech
lynching for uppity blacks" in his statement to the Senate Judiciary
Committee.43
40. See Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344 (holding that our country's system of justice
requires that a lawyer must be provided for those criminal defendants who cannot
afford one is fundamental to).
41. See generally DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL: THE UNTOLD STORY (1994)
(describing Anita Hill as "a little bit nutty and a little bit slutty but later renounced
the 1992 best-selling book, in which this statement was made); Jonathan Alter, From
Cold War to Steamy Sex: Conservative Turncoat David Brock is an Ideal Poster Child for the
Debased Politics of the '90's, NEWSWEEK, July 9, 2001, at 36 (discussing how the media,
including David Brock's book, depicts public figures).
42. See, e.g., Adrienne D. Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: The
Treatnent of Sex and Race in the Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1367, 1380
(1992) (explaining how Clarence Thomas had accused the Senate Judiciary
Committee of racial discrimination in regard to the Anita Hill allegations). But see
137 CONG. REc. S15117-02 (daily ed. Oct. 24, 1991) (statement of Sen. Leahy) ("Race
played no role in the Senate's decision to investigate, and it was unworthy for those
who supported Judge Thomas to claim that it did. It was even more unworthy for
Judge Thomas to endorse such claims.").
43. Mortimer B. Zuckerman, Black and White in America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Oct. 28, 1991, at 92 (quoting Thomas' "impassioned reference to a 'high-tech
lynching for uppity blacks'" ); see also 137 CONG. REC. S14622-01 (daily ed. Oct. 15,
1991) (statement of Sen. Exon) (commenting that Thomas' statements that the
Senate Hearing had occurred "in a manner equivalent to... a lynch mob" was a
statement that was "well orchestrated and employed" by Thomas and his
supporters).
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In retrospect one can only assume that Thomas would have
regretted comparing his odyssey, painful as it must have been, to the
deaths and brutal mutilations of thousands of other African-
Americans over the past 200 years. But even with the rhetoric
somewhat toned down, it seemed like an odd and inconsistent charge
to be made by Thomas for at least two reasons. First, he had
distinguished himself as one of the few African-Americans who
demonstrated an almost enthusiastic willingness to reject allegations
of discrimination raised by other racial minorities in his position as
head of the United States Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission ("EEOC") 44 and elsewhere. 45 It is ironic that during
Thomas' most serious personal and professional crisis, a man who
had built his career on a belief (one can only assume that it was a
sincerely held one) that too many of the difficulties that African-
Americans have experienced since the civil rights movement have
been attributed to racial bias, would fall back on this same
explanation to describe his situation. Thomas used the now
legendary "race card" in a more profound and significant way than
Johnny Cochron or anyone else has ever used it.
Second, Thomas' claim of racial discrimination had such a
remarkably weak basis. Thomas' allegation appears to have been that
the allegations of sexual harassment were not only erroneous, but
were only raised against him because he was a black person who was
also a conservative by people who had a particular animus to black
44. See Bruce Shapiro, Good Reasons for Doubting Thomas, THE NATION, Sept. 23,
1991, at 336 (discussing how, as head of the EEOC, Thomas initially defended some
affirmative action policies; however, in 1984, he opposed all affirmative action and
began blocking enforcement of anti-discrimination laws. In fact, he told the
Heritage Foundation in 1987 that "I believe firmly that I should have taken a more
aggressive stand against affirmative action in earlier years."); see also Carlson, supra
note 1, at 18 (stating that Thomas rejected the use of minority-hiring statistics to
prove discrimination and once asked a congressional committee whether anyone
would ever suggest that Georgetown University was discriminating against white
basketball players because its team was all black); Kaplan, supra note 2, at 18 (quoting
Thomas as stating that those civil rights leaders who opposed him when he was
appointed to a second term as chair of the EEOC did little more than "bitch, bitch,
bitch, moan and whine"); Tim Smart, A Conundrum Named Clarence Thomas, Bus. WK.,
July 15, 1991, at 27 (noting that Thomas angered civil rights organizations by shifting
the EEOC's focus from class-action cases and hiring goals for minority groups to
specific acts of discrimination); Kenneth T. Walsh et al., Scouting Thomas: Bush's Court
Nominee Sparks Renewed Debate Over Race and Abortion, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July
15, 1991, at 22 (noting that in 1982, the EEOC filed ninety-five cases in court on
behalf of individuals, but by 1989, after Thomas changed direction, the EEOC filed
392 such actions).
45. See Kaplan, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing how during his brief stint as head
of the Office of Civil Rights in the U.S. Department of Education, Thomas clashed
with Department employees who accused him of refusing to enforce anti-
discrimination laws in school athletic programs).
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conservatives (as opposed, I assume, to black liberals and/or white
conservatives). So even if one accepts Thomas' factual assertion -
that there was an organized attempt to smear his good name
orchestrated by people who wanted to harm him because of the
combination of his race and his ideology - as true, it is difficult to
see how such an act, as despicable as it may be, would constitute
racial discrimination. Again, according to Thomas, it was his
willingness to express his beliefs that resulted in the attacks on him.
If another black man had expressed other beliefs, under this theory,
he would not have been attacked in the same way. Although one can
imagine a subtle and nuanced argument that explains the ways how
the intersection of race with other factors such as gender, class, or
ideology can lead to a wholly independent experience of
discrimination other than the commonplace form of overt racial bias,
it is easy to imagine how Thomas and other judicial conservatives
would respond to such a textured and subtle legal construction.
Suffice it to say, the EEOC under Thomas' leadership was not at the
forefront of groundbreaking new causes of action for new kinds of
racial discrimination." While on the Court, Justice Thomas has
expressed a willingness to support such expansions if they extend to
actionable instances of racial discrimination.
47
While I am again reluctant to claim knowledge of the motivations
of others, the inherent inconsistency of Justice Thomas' beliefs and
actions caused me great concern. The inconsistency arouse from the
willingness of Thomas, who had raised serious and indeed
compelling arguments about the negative impact of frivolously using
the "race card" and the impact such assertions have on those who
46. See supra note 44.
47. For example, Thomas has refused to accept political district gerrymandering
that entrenches white incumbents as discrimination against minorities and has ruled
with the other conservative Justices that creation of remedial majority-minority voting
districts violates the Equal Protection clause. See Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541,
548-49 (1999) (finding that summary judgement in racial gerrymander case is not
appropriate where "evidence tends to support an inference that the State drew its
district lines with an impermissible racial motive - even [with] no direct evidence of
intent"); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 924 (1995) (holding that Georgia's
congressional redistricting plan that attempted to create majority-minority voting
districts violated the Equal Protection clause because it did not advance a compelling
state interest); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 649 (1993) (holding that the appellants
had stated a claim in order to defeat a motion to dismiss in a case challenging a
reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause as a form of racial
gerrymander that intended to separate voters into different districts on the basis of
race, even if the purpose of the redrawing was to give a stronger political voice to
minorities); see also Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1000 (1996) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(arguing that two majority-minority voting districts in Texas were subject to strict
scrutiny because all racial classifications by the government, including state legislative
redistricting, must be strictly scrutinized).
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genuinely suffer from racial bias,48 to use that very same "race card"
when his place on the highest court was in doubt, and when the
allegation rang hollow.
The other major instance of an apparent inconsistency involves
Justice Thomas' views about affirmative action. For years before his
nomination to the Court, Clarence Thomas expressed a strong
opposition to affirmative action on both legal and moral grounds.49
He argued that past discrimination did not justify current racial
preferences and that to the extent these programs helped blacks,
they primarily helped middle and upper middle class blacks without
addressing the problems of the poorest and neediest in the
community.50 He also argued that affirmative action programs
created a stigma for those who benefited from them by fostering the
impression that the apparent beneficiaries were somehow
undeserving of their positions in schools, jobs, or whatever else they
may have obtained through some kind of racial preference.1 Indeed,
Justice Thomas has stated that this stigma is reason enough to justify
ending the practice.5s
Quite understandably, Justice Thomas has been questioned about
how he can reconcile these views with his own apparent benefit from
affirmative action in his admittance to Yale Law School. Many have
asserted that it is disingenuous, or worse, for a man who was admitted
to school based on affirmative action to argue that others should not. 53
benefit from the practice. I am willing to accept the notion that
48. See Clarence Thomas, Affirmative Action Goals and Timetables: Too Tough? Not
Tough Enough!, 5 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 402, 410-11 (1987) (arguing that affirmative
action programs should only be used for those individuals who have suffered actual
harm based on his or her race, rather than merely an individual's race alone). But
see Scott D. Gerber, Justice Clarence Thomas and the Jurisprudence of Race, 25 S.U. L. REV.
43, 46 (1997) (outlining six opinions that Justice Thomas wrote during his first five
years on the Supreme Court which illustrate the subtle changes in Justice Thomas's
opinions regarding affirmative action).
49. See Thomas, supra note 48, at 410-11 (stating that " [a]ny preferences given
should be directly related to the obstacles that have been unfairly placed in...
individuals' paths, rather than on the basis of race or gender").
50. See id. at 410 (explaining that the problems of the poorest and neediest in the
community call for remedial education and training especially as technological
continues to advances and the economy continues to shift from a manufacturing to a
services-based economy).
51. See id. at 402 n.3 (stating that " [c]lass preferences are an affront to the rights
and dignity of individuals... I think that preferential hiring on the basis of race or
gender will increase racial divisiveness, disempower women and minorities by
fostering the notion that they are permanently disabled and in need of handouts").
52. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 240 (1995) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (arguing that affirmative action stamps minorities "with a badge of
inferiority' and equating the practice with "laws designed to subjugate a race").
53. See, e.g., Neil A. Lewis, Justice Thomas Suggests Critics' Views Are Racist, N.Y.
TIMES, July 30, 1998, at A 1 (quoting former Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals
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someone can benefit from a program like affirmative action in his or
her youth, and then argue consistently for ending the practice. But
this is not the position that Justice Thomas has taken. Instead of
acknowledging the role that affirmative action played in his law
school admission, he has offered the less-than-convincing argument
that there was no real affirmative action program (no "set aside" or
"preference" per se) at Yale University the year that he was admitted,
but simply an initiative to find otherwise qualified applicants of
different races.54 Regardless of what the real story of Clarence
Thomas' admission to law school is, I can certainly imagine how he
might have allowed himself to benefit from affirmative action in law
school admissions feeling that there was nothing wrong with that at
the time and only later, maybe as a result of some negative personal
experiences in law school, have concluded that there were flaws with
the system.
I find a disturbing inconsistency in his response to a much more
important instance of affirmative action that happened later in his
life - his nomination to the Supreme Court of the United States.
When asked if race had played a part in his nomination of Thomas to
the Court, President Bush responded that he had appointed "the
most qualified person" for the position.55 When asked the same
question, Thomas said that he had no reason to disagree with
President Bush, but that even if race' did play a role, it was an
appropriate factor for President Bush to consider.
First, I can not imagine there is anyone who would seriously argue,
notwithstanding these statements, that race played no role in the
nomination of Clarance Thomas to the Supreme Court. I think that
if one were to judge applicants for positions in school or for jobs on
their objective qualifications alone, as demanded by the foes of
for the Third Circuit, A. Leon Higginbotham's statements regarding Thomas'
hypocrisy for opposing affirmative action after having benefited from it at Yale
University).
54. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the U.S.: He arngs Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 102d Cong.,
251, 358 (1991) [hereinafter Nomination Hearing] (statement of Clarence Thomas)
(claiming that the Yale University program made an active effort to recruit minorities
to apply, but then evaluated them on their individual merits and never used specific
quotas).
55. Richard Cohen, As It Happens ... , WASH. POST MAG., July 26, 1992, at W5
(stating that "President Bush... defended his choice of Clarence Thomas for the
Supreme Court... [by saying] of all the lawyers in the whole country, Clarence
Thomas was the most qualified").
56. See Nomination Hearings, supra note 54, at 263 ("The President indicated that
he nominated me [because] I was the best qualified. I take him at his word, but I
also believe that there is a need in all of our institutions, on the Supreme Court and
elsewhere, in diversity. I think it is important to our society.").
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affirmative action, it would be impossible to contend under any
objective standards, that Justice Thomas was the most qualified person
for the job in 1991.
What might the objective indicators of qualification for the highest
court in the land be? Grades in law school? No, that seems a bit silly.
How about length and depth of legal experience, and time on the
federal or other high court bench? That seems a bit better. The
American Bar Association, which until recently played a key role in
the evaluation of the qualifications of nominees to the federal bench,
uses this indicator as their relevant criteria.
Justice Thomas had served as a federal judge for approximately a
year and a half when he was nominated.58 Although no one would
suggest that nomination of Supreme Court Justices should be
determined on time spent as a federal judge alone, no person can
argue that there were not many other judges with substantially more
experience than Clarence Thomas when he was nominated.5 9 The
point is not that his relative lack of qualifications should have
precluded his nomination. Rather, the focus here is the apparent
inconsistencies in some of the beliefs Justice Thomas'has expressed
and some of his subsequent statements and actions.
As I have already stated, I do not claim to be clairvoyant, but it is
hard to imagine that Justice Thomas was not aware of his relative lack
of objective qualifications when he accepted his nomination. He
certainly cannot claim to have been unaware of the specific Justice
that he was being nominated to replace. Indeed, he discussed the
importance of Justice Thurgood Marshall's role as an African-
American on the Court during his confirmation hearings.60 Again,
57. The ABA's Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary evaluated a
nominee's "professional qualifications," such as competence, integrity, and judicial
temperament. In the late 1970s, the rules of the body were amended to permit
consideration of extreme political views if they were thought to affect a candidate's
judicial temperament. See Terry Eastland, Closing Time for the Bar; And Happy Hour for
Conservatives, WKLY. STANDARD, Apr. 2, 2001, at 12. The ABA's evaluation criteria
during the Bork nomination permitted examination of a prospective nominee's
compassion and open-mindedness. See Elisabeth Frater, Revenge of the Bork
Conservatives, NAT'LJ., Mar. 31, 2001, at 970.
58. See Carlson, supra note 1, at 18 (providing a brief biography of Clarence
Thomas).
59. See id. (noting that "as Supreme Court nominees go, Thomas had little
judicial experience... [and was] not a brilliant legal scholar, a weighty thinker or
even the author of numerous opinions"). But see The Supreme Court, 1999 Term: The
Statistics, supra note 13, at 395 (displaying that Thomas placed in the "middle of the
pack" regarding the number of opinions that he authored compared to other
Justices).
60. See Nomination Hearing, supra note 54, at 358 (praising Thurgood Marshall as
one of the great architects of the legal battles to open doors that seemed so
hopelessly and permanently sealed and to knock down barriers that seemed so
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there is an apparent inconsistency created by the acceptance of the
personal benefits of racial preferences by someone who has so
strongly argued against their application. It is one of the true ironies
that undoubtedly the most powerful and influential African-American
opponent of affirmative action is now, just as undoubtedly, the
African-American who has attained the highest ever position because
of, in at least some significant part, his race.
As I have noted, my personal concerns about the first ten years of
Justice Thomas' tenure on the Court are not because of his ideology
and judicial decisions. Instead, my concerns are raised by the
inconsistencies inherent in the new conservative judicial activism,
Justice Thomas' shocking use of the "race card" during his
confirmation process, and his personal benefit from affirmative
action. I am sure that Justice Thomas is a good and well-meaning
individual, and notwithstanding the fact that he has the nerve to
disagree with my politics and judicial philosophy, I believe that he
can become, as the man that he replaced on the Court was, a role
model for a segment of the nation in great need of one. I hope that
in the decades to come, the kind of inconsistencies that I have noted
will not continue and that they might be addressed and explained
more directly. I hope that Justice Thomas will be judged as he should
be judged, based solely on his work on the Court, and his opinions
and public statements.
insurmountable to those of us in the Pin Point, [Georgia's] of the world.").
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